Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History – George Crile

Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History – George Crile, Atlantic Monthly Press (2003) 550p. (S) * (revised edit)

This hagiographic drivel attempts to lionize a man, Charlie Wilson, who could not have more flaws. While it is true that Crile has a “warts and all” style to his writing, there is, nonetheless, an adulatory tone that pervades the entire work, leaving the reader to think that where Charlie Wilson went, no mere mortals tread. And while Crile tries to paint Wilson as some latter day anti-establishmentarian rebel, the facts would seem to speak otherwise. “Wilson had a reputation for never having met a weapons system he didn’t like . . . ”(p.249) among other things, as well as for being rabidly pro-Israel. So it doesn’t come as much of a surprise that Wilson fit very smugly in the pocket of the military-industrial-complex, so that wherever the big money was in special interests and campaign contributions, Wilson was there. Consider as well, that as a member of the House appropriations committee, and later the House intelligence committee, Wilson placed himself at the nexus of covert foreign policy and the funding it requires. In this given milieu, and with the backdrop of the Cold War, can one really say that Charlie Wilson, with the indispensable assistance of a CIA officer named Gust Avrakotos, really stuck his neck out when advocating for the Afghan mujahideen? “ . . . [The Afghan mujahideen] ‘freedom fighters’ seemed to be loved by everyone on the Hill. No one spoke ill of them, not even the press.”(p.340) With a free pass from the press and a compliant Congress, can one really say that in such an environment the risks that Wilson was assuming in securing funds for the Afghan resistance, were at all that great?

Then there is also, of course, the “blowback” (a.k.a. unforeseen consequences) aspect of the 1980s U.S. Afghan policy. Here Crile devotes seventeen pages in his epilogue, in drawing the links of the likes of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (one of the most fanatic of the Islamic fundamentalists being funded by U.S. taxpayers in the 1980s, but who at the same time was the most favored by the CIA and ISI [Pakistani intelligence] because of his reputation for being the most ferocious of fighters among the mujahideen) and Osama Bin Laden, to the tragic events of 9/11/01. Apparently, even after that day, Wilson remained unapologetic about the policy he so ardently undertook in the 1980s, continuing to fund the mujahideen even after the Soviet withdrawal. While Crile traces Wilson’s penchant for championing the underdog to his experiences as a child and to the teachings of his mother, one can’t help but think that there indeed must be something else that causes a man to so avidly advocate a policy of war. That missing element could quite possibly be the absence of any direct combat experience in Wilson’s formative years. Given this absence, even though Wilson did serve in the Navy, there is perhaps an allotted leeway that permits the mind to wonder and thus romanticize armed conflict. (One could trace a similar trend among the hawks that reign today in the present Bush administration.)

There is also the question of what impact did the Afghan war really have on the Soviets. Did it really cause, according to Wilson, the Berlin Wall to fall “‘ . . . a good five, maybe ten, years before it would have otherwise.’”(p.523) This is a point of historical speculation that naturally could be endlessly debated. However, one question that rarely gets asked, and one that even Crile neglects to raise, is whether the Soviets had more business being in Afghanistan than the U.S. did during the 1980s. Yes, there was a brutal occupation by the Soviets and there was president Carter’s “Presidential Findings” that authorized the CIA to launch war in Afghanistan, but given that the proximity of this country is much closer to the Soviet Union than it is to the U.S., can the Soviets be blamed for their incursion? Both Wilson and Avrakotos are quoted as saying they saw Afghanistan as payback and retribution for Vietnam. Is this really the appropriate lens with which to look upon U.S. policy in Afghanistan? Clearly, there were plenty of entities, in many different countries, that according to Crile, were making plenty of money on the war. What does this say ultimately about Wilson’s efforts, especially given the present day “war on terrorism”?

Finally, there is a quote early in this book that despite its limited relevance, as it refers to one of Wilson’s girlfriends, Joanne Herring, can’t be overlooked. “Something about Texas and its oil heritage seems to permit its citizens to reinvent their histories and to carry out their lives as if they were part of an ongoing theatrical experience.”(p.65) Is there a better single sentence synopsis for characterizing the “born again” life of George W. Bush? This comes with the reviewer’s apologies to the reader for stretching this review’s topicality. However, he considers it his duty to bring to the reader’s attention good writing, when and where ever it may occur.