House of Bush House of Saud: The Secret Relationship Between the World’s Two Most Powerful Dynasties – Craig Unger
House of Bush House of Saud: The Secret Relationship Between the World’s Two Most Powerful Dynasties – Craig Unger, Scribner (2004) 370pp. (S) ****
Much of what is known about the circumstances surrounding 9/11 is in no small part attributable to books like House of Bush House of Saud. Where the major corporate media has failed us, these books have picked up the pace, or as Craig Unger puts it, “Media watchers noted that the book-publishing industry was serving as a surrogate for an aggressive Washington press corps that appeared to be missing in action. It was as if reporters were afraid to ask the tough questions because they feared losing access to exclusive interviews with the key players in the administration.”(p.285) The next logical follow-up question is why the “book-publishing industry” waited three to four years to begin its serious inquiry into the Bush II administration? Maybe this is because “when the presidential race got underway in 2000, however, no such statements about Iraq were forthcoming [from Bush].”(p.195) War, or even the talk of war, makes for much more sensational news than unearthing inconsistencies in a presidential candidate’s gubernatorial record.
According to Unger, “in all, at least $1.476 billion has made its way from the Saudis to the house of Bush and its allied companies and institutions.”(p.200) That’s the kind of money that can buy a lot of influence. No wonder Bush actively courted the Muslim vote in the 2000 election, especially in Florida, where it quite possibly paid off in the dividend of the presidency itself. This too may account for the reason that terrorism was far from a priority during the Bush administration’s first nine months.
It is also interesting to note and compare how the Bush Sr. and the Clinton administrations treated their lame duck periods. The former launched a full military operation in Somalia, while the latter sought restraint in countering the October 2000 USS Cole attack, but instead chose to council heavily the incoming administration about the importance of al Qaeda and terrorism, factors the Clinton team believed would play predominantly in the coming months and years. Too bad much of this advice fell on deaf ears
Unger also helps to clarify a few points that are skewed in the official 9/11 Commission Report. First, there is the matter of the private flights that ushered Saudis out of the U.S. ostensibly for the purposes of ensuring their own protection, during a period when the FAA had a ban that kept all private aircraft (numbering 200,000 in the U.S.) grounded nationwide. Twice in the 9/11 report, it is stated that part of bin Laden’s goal is to convert the United States to Islam. Yet, Unger writes “bin Laden’s jihad against the United States includes two specific goals: the complete removal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia and the overthrow of the house of Saud.”(p.278-79) Add to this the cessation of U.S. aid to Israel and corrupt Arab governments, and that is about the extent of stated al Qaeda objectives. This is to say that al Qaeda’s grievances are more about our foreign policy than an existential opposition to “who we are,” (part of which is, admittedly, defined by our foreign policy).
Much of what is known about the circumstances surrounding 9/11 is in no small part attributable to books like House of Bush House of Saud. Where the major corporate media has failed us, these books have picked up the pace, or as Craig Unger puts it, “Media watchers noted that the book-publishing industry was serving as a surrogate for an aggressive Washington press corps that appeared to be missing in action. It was as if reporters were afraid to ask the tough questions because they feared losing access to exclusive interviews with the key players in the administration.”(p.285) The next logical follow-up question is why the “book-publishing industry” waited three to four years to begin its serious inquiry into the Bush II administration? Maybe this is because “when the presidential race got underway in 2000, however, no such statements about Iraq were forthcoming [from Bush].”(p.195) War, or even the talk of war, makes for much more sensational news than unearthing inconsistencies in a presidential candidate’s gubernatorial record.
According to Unger, “in all, at least $1.476 billion has made its way from the Saudis to the house of Bush and its allied companies and institutions.”(p.200) That’s the kind of money that can buy a lot of influence. No wonder Bush actively courted the Muslim vote in the 2000 election, especially in Florida, where it quite possibly paid off in the dividend of the presidency itself. This too may account for the reason that terrorism was far from a priority during the Bush administration’s first nine months.
It is also interesting to note and compare how the Bush Sr. and the Clinton administrations treated their lame duck periods. The former launched a full military operation in Somalia, while the latter sought restraint in countering the October 2000 USS Cole attack, but instead chose to council heavily the incoming administration about the importance of al Qaeda and terrorism, factors the Clinton team believed would play predominantly in the coming months and years. Too bad much of this advice fell on deaf ears
Unger also helps to clarify a few points that are skewed in the official 9/11 Commission Report. First, there is the matter of the private flights that ushered Saudis out of the U.S. ostensibly for the purposes of ensuring their own protection, during a period when the FAA had a ban that kept all private aircraft (numbering 200,000 in the U.S.) grounded nationwide. Twice in the 9/11 report, it is stated that part of bin Laden’s goal is to convert the United States to Islam. Yet, Unger writes “bin Laden’s jihad against the United States includes two specific goals: the complete removal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia and the overthrow of the house of Saud.”(p.278-79) Add to this the cessation of U.S. aid to Israel and corrupt Arab governments, and that is about the extent of stated al Qaeda objectives. This is to say that al Qaeda’s grievances are more about our foreign policy than an existential opposition to “who we are,” (part of which is, admittedly, defined by our foreign policy).
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