The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions – David Ray Griffin
The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions – David Ray Griffin, Olive Branch Press (2005) 339pp. (S) ***
In his follow-up to The New Pearl Harbor, David Ray Griffin has offered a critique of the 9/11 Commission Report itself. Apart from at times being tediously redundant in the minutiae of the 9/11 timeline, it is clear that it is Griffin’s intent to be as thorough as possible when broaching so momentous and incongruous an event as 9/11. In fact, Griffin openly acknowledges and embraces his limitations, as it would be quite impossible for anyone to cover every aspect of 9/11 in a single volume. This, however, does not leave the 9/11 Commission Report off the hook.
To begin with, Griffin first makes a vital distinction about who is exactly in charge of the commission. “ . . . [T]he commission’s investigation was essentially run by [executive director, Philip] Zelikow.”(p.7) Hence, from this point on, Griffin aptly refers to the commission as the Kean-Zelikow Commission (as opposed to the Kean-Hamilton Commission). With Zelikow’s strong personal links to members of the administration, his positioning within the commission in such a strategic leadership role, is indeed no small matter.
Griffin then raises the point that whereas the passenger manifests of the four 9/11 aircraft, were never publicly released by the airlines, and that whereas six of the nineteen hijackers named, later came forward to state that indeed they were very much alive, the identities of all the hijackers, and their true number, may in fact never be truly known. The fact that fifteen of the hijackers were said to be Saudi also raises an interesting point that does not go unnoticed by Griffin. “ . . . [S]ome people may suspect that [investigative journalist, Gerald] Posner is part of a plot to prepare the American public for a possible invasion of Saudi Arabia at some time in the future. [By making the ] claim that 15 of the hijackers were Saudi nationals, the U.S. government could argue, if and when it became convenient, that it had learned that the attacks of 9/11 had been planned and funded by the Saudi government.”(p.64) This is Griffin at his best, positing a likely scenario given the neo-con’s lust for infinite war and Arab blood.
In the second half of Griffin’s book, he analyzes each flight individually. Starting with American Airlines flight 11, most of Griffin’s focus is upon inconsistencies in the timeline itself, be it between initial reports and the Commission’s final draft, or be it how alternative analyses stack up. As Griffin wonders why Flight 11 wasn’t at least intercepted by military aircraft performing CAP (combat air patrol), he writes “(Bringing down a hijacked passenger jet [AAL Flight 11] over any part of New York City would likely, of course, result in considerable death and destruction. But can anyone say that taking that risk would have been worse than letting hijackers strike their intended target?)”(p.166) Well, how about any one who isn’t looking backward through the lens of 20/20 vision? While Flight 11 was still airborne, no one knew that its “intended target” was the World Trade Center. Imagine the liability to the U.S. government had Flight 11 been actually shot down over the skies of New York City. There simply would be no end to what would’ve surely been perceived as the act of a careless, trigger happy pilot. Likely this is why the commission’s “official” line is unable to allow that United Flight 93 was indeed likely shot down.
It appears that Griffin is of the mind that the FAA unfairly “took the fall” for the many blunders made on the day of 9/11/01. Indeed, there is this in the Commission’s report: “Boston Center [air traffic control] did not follow the protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of command.”(p.20) Yet at the same time, the commission recognizes that NORAD officials gave “incorrect” testimony regarding the response times to Flight 11. Between the two, FAA and NORAD, no one was ever reprimanded. Far from it, personnel directly involved in 9/11 negligence were actually promoted by the administration.
Finally, there is this: “Some critics of the official account of 9/11 believe that if we ever get a full account of how the attacks were able to succeed, we will see that a vital role was played by some military exercises, sometimes called ‘war games,’ that had been scheduled for that morning [on 9/11/01].”(p.268) This is exactly Mike Ruppert’s contention in Crossing the Rubicon, but strangely, Griffin opts not to cite him here. Only within the fog of “military exercises” could standard operating procedure be so grossly deviated from, neglected, and outright abandoned. Quite aptly, Griffin quotes Michael Parenti as saying “‘policymakers [sometimes] seize upon incompetence as a cover.’”(p.262) This is exactly what the 9/11 Commission Report is about. Citing failure at multiple levels of government with zero accountability is the record that the Commission leaves for baffled readers. Only until we fully understand what Operations “Vigilant Guardian” and “Vigilant Warrior” were all about, can the key to unlocking 9/11’s dark secrets be found. There are 80,000 flights a day, just within U.S. airspace alone, so that for four flights to go unaccounted for within a period of two hours, is a major anomaly in itself, one that couldn’t happen without significant assistance and complicity at the highest levels of government. This is the bigger picture that Griffin misses in his minute by minute breakdown of each flight.
Incompetence should no longer be allowed to be used as a “cover.” If someone is killed in an automobile accident that you caused, then there is a charge known as vehicular homicide. If 3,000 Americans are killed within a two hour window, then the least we should expect is a charge of negligent homicide, not, of all things, promotion of those directly responsible.
In his follow-up to The New Pearl Harbor, David Ray Griffin has offered a critique of the 9/11 Commission Report itself. Apart from at times being tediously redundant in the minutiae of the 9/11 timeline, it is clear that it is Griffin’s intent to be as thorough as possible when broaching so momentous and incongruous an event as 9/11. In fact, Griffin openly acknowledges and embraces his limitations, as it would be quite impossible for anyone to cover every aspect of 9/11 in a single volume. This, however, does not leave the 9/11 Commission Report off the hook.
To begin with, Griffin first makes a vital distinction about who is exactly in charge of the commission. “ . . . [T]he commission’s investigation was essentially run by [executive director, Philip] Zelikow.”(p.7) Hence, from this point on, Griffin aptly refers to the commission as the Kean-Zelikow Commission (as opposed to the Kean-Hamilton Commission). With Zelikow’s strong personal links to members of the administration, his positioning within the commission in such a strategic leadership role, is indeed no small matter.
Griffin then raises the point that whereas the passenger manifests of the four 9/11 aircraft, were never publicly released by the airlines, and that whereas six of the nineteen hijackers named, later came forward to state that indeed they were very much alive, the identities of all the hijackers, and their true number, may in fact never be truly known. The fact that fifteen of the hijackers were said to be Saudi also raises an interesting point that does not go unnoticed by Griffin. “ . . . [S]ome people may suspect that [investigative journalist, Gerald] Posner is part of a plot to prepare the American public for a possible invasion of Saudi Arabia at some time in the future. [By making the ] claim that 15 of the hijackers were Saudi nationals, the U.S. government could argue, if and when it became convenient, that it had learned that the attacks of 9/11 had been planned and funded by the Saudi government.”(p.64) This is Griffin at his best, positing a likely scenario given the neo-con’s lust for infinite war and Arab blood.
In the second half of Griffin’s book, he analyzes each flight individually. Starting with American Airlines flight 11, most of Griffin’s focus is upon inconsistencies in the timeline itself, be it between initial reports and the Commission’s final draft, or be it how alternative analyses stack up. As Griffin wonders why Flight 11 wasn’t at least intercepted by military aircraft performing CAP (combat air patrol), he writes “(Bringing down a hijacked passenger jet [AAL Flight 11] over any part of New York City would likely, of course, result in considerable death and destruction. But can anyone say that taking that risk would have been worse than letting hijackers strike their intended target?)”(p.166) Well, how about any one who isn’t looking backward through the lens of 20/20 vision? While Flight 11 was still airborne, no one knew that its “intended target” was the World Trade Center. Imagine the liability to the U.S. government had Flight 11 been actually shot down over the skies of New York City. There simply would be no end to what would’ve surely been perceived as the act of a careless, trigger happy pilot. Likely this is why the commission’s “official” line is unable to allow that United Flight 93 was indeed likely shot down.
It appears that Griffin is of the mind that the FAA unfairly “took the fall” for the many blunders made on the day of 9/11/01. Indeed, there is this in the Commission’s report: “Boston Center [air traffic control] did not follow the protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of command.”(p.20) Yet at the same time, the commission recognizes that NORAD officials gave “incorrect” testimony regarding the response times to Flight 11. Between the two, FAA and NORAD, no one was ever reprimanded. Far from it, personnel directly involved in 9/11 negligence were actually promoted by the administration.
Finally, there is this: “Some critics of the official account of 9/11 believe that if we ever get a full account of how the attacks were able to succeed, we will see that a vital role was played by some military exercises, sometimes called ‘war games,’ that had been scheduled for that morning [on 9/11/01].”(p.268) This is exactly Mike Ruppert’s contention in Crossing the Rubicon, but strangely, Griffin opts not to cite him here. Only within the fog of “military exercises” could standard operating procedure be so grossly deviated from, neglected, and outright abandoned. Quite aptly, Griffin quotes Michael Parenti as saying “‘policymakers [sometimes] seize upon incompetence as a cover.’”(p.262) This is exactly what the 9/11 Commission Report is about. Citing failure at multiple levels of government with zero accountability is the record that the Commission leaves for baffled readers. Only until we fully understand what Operations “Vigilant Guardian” and “Vigilant Warrior” were all about, can the key to unlocking 9/11’s dark secrets be found. There are 80,000 flights a day, just within U.S. airspace alone, so that for four flights to go unaccounted for within a period of two hours, is a major anomaly in itself, one that couldn’t happen without significant assistance and complicity at the highest levels of government. This is the bigger picture that Griffin misses in his minute by minute breakdown of each flight.
Incompetence should no longer be allowed to be used as a “cover.” If someone is killed in an automobile accident that you caused, then there is a charge known as vehicular homicide. If 3,000 Americans are killed within a two hour window, then the least we should expect is a charge of negligent homicide, not, of all things, promotion of those directly responsible.
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