America’s “War on Terrorism" – Michel Chussudovsky
America’s “War on Terrorism” – Michel Chussudovsky, Global Research (2005) 365pp. (OBT) ***
For the already jaded reader, Michel Chussudovsky provides little relief. In America’s “War on Terrorism” nothing is at it appears on the surface. At the root of the U.S. “war on terror” is economic lust for diminishing global resources, principally gas and oil. (See also Forbidden Truth by Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquie.) From the picture that Chussudovsky paints, rarely is it the occasion when the CIA is not behind nefarious plots and terrorist organizations and the distinctions between the Clinton and the Bush II foreign policies are few and far between. Such broad stroked overgeneralizations are hardly helpful when the reader is attempting to attain a more nuanced and balanced perspective.
From the former Soviet Central Asian states to the Balkans, Chussudovsky sees an American hand in backing radical Islamic movements, even the Chechen rebels. The intent is to destabilize these states as a precursor to exploiting their natural resources. Chussudovsky even describes a November 2001 American airlift of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters out of the combat zone into the safety of Pakistan, the ostensible purpose being that the U.S. would need enemies for another day in order to propagate and continue its “war on terror.”
Chussudovsky also describes the psychological warfare on the homefront in the form of the department of Homeland Security’s color coded warning system and its use of elevated “code orange.” Often the peculiar timing of these elevated alerts belay political motives. Once particular incident cited by Chussudovsky is the London 7/7/05 bombing, where he recounts that for the exact time and place of the actual bombings, virtual exercises simulating just such a scenario of bombings in the London underground had been planned. The coincidence is more than uncanny.
In his final pages, Chussudovsky drops this bomb: “ . . . Bush’s National Security Doctrine is a continuation of that formulated under the Clinton administration in the mid 1990s . . . ” Funny how this reviewer does not recall a war of aggression policy (a.k.a. preemptive war) under Clinton, nor does he recall things like “extraordinary rendition,” torture a la Guantanomo Bay and Abu Ghraib, unwarranted domestic surveillance, and the like. Perhaps his memory is faulty, but having lived though the 1990s – a decade that was certainly not without its flaws with respect to U.S. foreign policy – primarily the expansion of “free trade” – he believes it safe to say unilateral war as since advanced by the United States, was not part of the picture.
For the already jaded reader, Michel Chussudovsky provides little relief. In America’s “War on Terrorism” nothing is at it appears on the surface. At the root of the U.S. “war on terror” is economic lust for diminishing global resources, principally gas and oil. (See also Forbidden Truth by Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquie.) From the picture that Chussudovsky paints, rarely is it the occasion when the CIA is not behind nefarious plots and terrorist organizations and the distinctions between the Clinton and the Bush II foreign policies are few and far between. Such broad stroked overgeneralizations are hardly helpful when the reader is attempting to attain a more nuanced and balanced perspective.
From the former Soviet Central Asian states to the Balkans, Chussudovsky sees an American hand in backing radical Islamic movements, even the Chechen rebels. The intent is to destabilize these states as a precursor to exploiting their natural resources. Chussudovsky even describes a November 2001 American airlift of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters out of the combat zone into the safety of Pakistan, the ostensible purpose being that the U.S. would need enemies for another day in order to propagate and continue its “war on terror.”
Chussudovsky also describes the psychological warfare on the homefront in the form of the department of Homeland Security’s color coded warning system and its use of elevated “code orange.” Often the peculiar timing of these elevated alerts belay political motives. Once particular incident cited by Chussudovsky is the London 7/7/05 bombing, where he recounts that for the exact time and place of the actual bombings, virtual exercises simulating just such a scenario of bombings in the London underground had been planned. The coincidence is more than uncanny.
In his final pages, Chussudovsky drops this bomb: “ . . . Bush’s National Security Doctrine is a continuation of that formulated under the Clinton administration in the mid 1990s . . . ” Funny how this reviewer does not recall a war of aggression policy (a.k.a. preemptive war) under Clinton, nor does he recall things like “extraordinary rendition,” torture a la Guantanomo Bay and Abu Ghraib, unwarranted domestic surveillance, and the like. Perhaps his memory is faulty, but having lived though the 1990s – a decade that was certainly not without its flaws with respect to U.S. foreign policy – primarily the expansion of “free trade” – he believes it safe to say unilateral war as since advanced by the United States, was not part of the picture.
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